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INTRODUCTION 
When, if ever, should a corporation be subject to a court’s 
jurisdiction based solely on the activities of another entity? Commonly, 
injured plaintiffs pursue foreign1 corporations to recover for injuries 
inflicted upon them by some activity of that corporation or its subsidiary.  
Where plaintiffs are unable to establish personal jurisdiction over the 
foreign corporation directly, plaintiffs may attempt to establish 
jurisdiction over the corporation indirectly by imputing to it the in-forum 
activities of a closely related subsidiary.2  This form of jurisdictional 
blame shifting has been termed “vicarious jurisdiction,”3 and it stems from 
the understanding that more than one entity may be responsible for the 
same events. Vicarious jurisdiction arguments are used to establish both 
specific and general adjudicative jurisdiction over foreign defendants. 
Specific jurisdiction is available for claims that arise out of, or are 
related to, the defendant’s activity or contacts within the forum.4  In 
contrast, general jurisdiction is available for claims that are unrelated to 
the defendant’s activities in the forum only if the defendant has a 
constitutionally sufficient relationship with the forum to be deemed “at 
                                                                                                                         
 1 For the moment, “foreign” may refer to either a corporation domiciled outside the 
territory of the United States or a domestic corporation domiciled outside the territory of 
the state in which the Plaintiff files suit. 
 2 See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(citations omitted) (“Generally, a foreign parent corporation is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing business 
there; the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant the 
assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign parent.  It has long been recognized, however, that 
in some circumstances, a close relationship between a parent and its subsidiary may justify 
a finding that the parent ‘does business’ in a jurisdiction through the local activities of its 
subsidiaries.”). 
 3 See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (2004). Others have called the practice “jurisdictional veil 
piercing.” Id. at 1029–30. 
 4 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) 
(quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (“Specific jurisdiction, on the 
other hand, depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ 
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore 
subject to the State’s regulation.”)). 
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home” there.5  Traditionally, corporations are “at home” in the state or 
states in which they are incorporated or maintain a principal place of 
business.6  Once general jurisdiction is established, the court has authority 
to adjudicate any claim brought against that defendant in the forum, 
regardless of whether the claims relate to the defendant’s activities in the 
forum.7 
The practice of imputing the contacts of a subsidiary to establish 
jurisdiction over the parent is historically more available in the context of 
specific jurisdiction. While a state’s regulatory interest in addressing 
harms caused by an absent defendant’s in-state activities is obvious, its 
regulatory interest in the out-of-state affairs of an in-state business is 
markedly lower.8  Thus, imputation arguments to establish specific 
jurisdiction are more defensible as consistent with the state’s regulatory 
interest in addressing in-state activity related to the claims. In the same 
way, imputation arguments to establish general jurisdiction are met with 
caution due to the state’s tenuous regulatory interest in the out-of-state 
activity.9  Accordingly, uncertainty remains as to the circumstances under 
which vicarious jurisdiction arguments will successfully establish general 
jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation. 
Recently, the Supreme Court affirmatively approved the use of 
vicarious jurisdiction arguments to establish general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporate defendants.10  In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court held 
                                                                                                                         
 5 Id. (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-
country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with 
the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the 
forum State.”). 
 6 Id. at 2853–54 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer Haverkamp, & Buck Logan, A 
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)). 
 7 Id. at 2851. 
 8 See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 698 (1987) (“[T]he state sometimes must 
exercise authority over persons outside its borders to give effect to the legitimate regulatory 
authority within its borders . . . .Recognition of this kind of jurisdiction is implicit in . . . the 
Court’s articulation of what is now known as ‘specific jurisdiction,’ that is, the power of 
the state to assert jurisdiction to redress a legal wrong committed or suffered within the 
state.”). 
 9 See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1092 (“[T]he exercise of general jurisdiction in veil-
piercing cases is uniquely problematic insofar as there will never be a regulatory interest 
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction when its sole basis is a reliance on veil piercing or 
some other artifice to merge otherwise separate entities.”). 
 10 In so ruling, the Court declined an opportunity to define a rule to govern when and 
how a subsidiary’s contacts might be imputed to a parent corporation, an issue that has 
been the subject of much dispute. Because state law largely governs theories of imputation, 
a corporation could be at the mercy of a different state law in any given forum, and some 
laws of imputation are more pro-jurisdiction than others.  The proper standard to govern 
imputation is beyond the scope of this paper.  The interested reader should consult the 
writings of Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, which provide an overview of the various theories 
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that the Due Process Clause permits, in limited circumstances, the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation based on the 
activities and contacts of its in-forum subsidiary.11  The Court determined 
that imputation of the subsidiary’s in-forum contacts to the foreign parent 
is insufficient by itself to establish general jurisdiction over the parent;12 
instead, after successful imputation, a court must conduct an additional 
inquiry to determine whether the parent corporation has contacts with the 
forum independently sufficient to subject it to the court’s general 
jurisdiction.13 
Does the Bauman test raise an insurmountably high bar for 
exercising general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants based on 
imputed contacts?  For example, under what circumstances would a 
foreign defendant ever be “at home”14 in a forum wherein its own contacts 
with the forum were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction in the first 
place?  In Bauman, the imputed contacts of a concededly “at home” 
subsidiary were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over the 
foreign parent.  According to the Court, a sufficient showing of activity or 
contacts in the forum could satisfy the ultimate “at home” inquiry as to the 
parent corporation if its subsidiary’s contacts were also imputed to the 
parent.  The Court left for future determination the quantity or quality of 
in-forum activities and contacts that would satisfy its standard. 
Appropriately, the Court’s decision in Bauman sharply confines the 
extent to which the imputation of a subsidiary’s contacts will be sufficient 
                                                                                                                         
of attribution and an argument against using substantive law in the determining imputation. 
See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (2004); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Further Thinking About Vicarious 
Jurisdiction: Reflecting on Goodyear v. Brown and Looking Ahead to Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 34 U. PA. L. REV. 765 (2013). Notably, the third prong of the Bauman test creates 
a constitutional limit on the ability of state law imputation theories to establish general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, which perhaps eases many of the concerns Hoffman 
raises.  See infra Parts I.C.2.–II. 
 11 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 n.16 (2014).  This case will be discussed 
in detail, infra Part I.C. 
 12 Id. Prior to Bauman, the lower courts routinely exercised general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporate defendants upon the initial determination that a subsidiary’s in-forum 
contacts could be imputed to the parent. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & 
Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1362–63 (11th Cir. 2006); Meier ex rel. Meier v. 
Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 13 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 760 n.16 (citing Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea 
Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at Part B.1, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014) 
(“[T]his Court mandates that contacts be shown for every defendant over whom 
jurisdiction is sought.”)); accord Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) (“[T]he 
requirements of International Shoe must be met as to each defendant over whom a state 
court exercises jurisdiction.”). 
 14 The history of corporate domicile and the “at home” standard that has come to 
govern where corporations are subject to suit is discussed at length, infra Parts I.A–B. 
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to establish general jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation.  
Nevertheless, vicarious jurisdiction arguments remain a viable means for 
establishing general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants.  The 
aim of this paper is to ascertain the parameters and efficacy of utilizing 
vicarious jurisdiction theories to establish general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporate defendants in light of Bauman. Part I first observes the historical 
development of general jurisdiction in federal courts.  Next, Part I 
concentrates on Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court’s recent landmark 
decision regarding general jurisdiction and imputation.  Part II analyzes 
the continuing viability of vicarious jurisdiction after Bauman, arguing 
that several limited avenues remain open for using imputation theories to 
establish general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants. 
I. GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN U.S. FEDERAL COURT 
A court has general jurisdiction over any defendant who is “at home” 
in the forum.15  While individuals are deemed “at home” in the singular 
location of their domicile,16 a corporation is “at home” in both its state of 
incorporation and its principal place of business, if the two are distinct.17  
The state of incorporation is the state whose laws give the corporation its 
personhood.  The location of a corporation’s principal place in business is 
less formally determined.  In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the Supreme Court 
announced that a corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve 
center”—the singular locus in which its “officers direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities.”18 
The “at home” inquiry, then, is an examination of the defendant’s 
relationship to the forum and to the litigation.  This general rule is the 
culmination of over a century of Supreme Court precedent delineating the 
constitutional boundaries of general jurisdiction over nonresident, 
corporate defendants.  Those precedents are discussed below. 
                                                                                                                         
 15 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 
(2011). 
 16 Id. at 2853. 
 17 Id. at 2854–54 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Jennifer Haverkamp, & Buck Logan, A 
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 735 (1988) (“Domicile, place 
of incorporation, and principal place of business are paradigms of bases for general 
jurisdiction.”)).  As will be discussed below, the Court left open the possibility that general 
jurisdiction could lie where a corporation’s contacts with the forum were so continuous 
and systematic that it could be rendered “essentially at home” in that forum. Id. at 2851 
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) 
(statutorily restricting a corporation’s citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction to 
“every” state in which it is incorporated and “the” state in which it has its principal place 
of business). 
 18 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192–93 (2010). 
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A. EARLY HISTORY 
1. Strict Territoriality of Pennoyer v. Neff 
In its infancy, personal jurisdiction was a function of the court’s 
“power over the defendant’s person.”19  Courts had adjudicatory power 
only over defendants who were physically present in the state or who had 
otherwise consented to the court’s jurisdiction.20  For individuals, physical 
presence equated to the person’s domicile21 or any state wherein the person 
was physically served with process.22  For corporations, physical presence 
was largely understood to be the state of its incorporation,23 and the court’s 
“power” over a corporation was substantiated by in-state service of 
process upon its corporate officers.24  The Supreme Court formalized this 
strict territoriality era of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff when it 
determined that principles of state sovereignty forbid a state court to 
“extend its process beyond that territory” and exercise jurisdiction over 
the “persons or property” of another state.25 
Despite an apparently impenetrable rule of territorial personal 
jurisdiction, Pennoyer allowed two exceptions.  The first exception 
permitted a court to exercise jurisdiction over absent defendants where the 
claims involved the forum state’s regulatory interest in defining civil 
status, such as marriage.26  The second exception preserved a state’s right 
to require that a nonresident entering into “a partnership or association” 
within the state appoint some person on whom process may be served 
within the State.27  The in-state presence of the agent on whom process 
                                                                                                                         
 19 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 20 McCormick v. Pennsylvania Cent. R. Co., 49 N.Y. 303, 309 (1872) (acknowledging 
that “voluntary appearance confers jurisdiction of the person” had been the accepted rule 
since 1819). 
 21 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (“The jurisdiction of the 
United States over its absent citizen . . . is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally 
bound to take notice of the laws that are applicable to him and to obey them.”). 
 22 See Hoffman, supra note 3, at 1036 (“At one time, in-state service was necessary for 
jurisdiction because of the territorial limitations imposed by the power theory.”). 
 23 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (“[A] corporation can 
have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created.”). 
 24 M’Queen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 5, 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (“The 
process against a corporation, must be served on its head, or principal officer, within the 
jurisdiction of the sovereignty where this artificial body exists.”). 
 25 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). 
 26 Id. at 734–35 (“The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon 
which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for 
which it may be dissolved.”). 
 27 Id. at 735.  Historically, states often required nonresident corporations, in exchange 
for the “privilege” of doing business within the state, to appoint an in-state agent to receive 
process for suits arising from the in-state business activities.  In this way, corporations 
“consented” to personal jurisdiction in the forum and could not insulate themselves from 
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could be served, then, became sufficient to exercise jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant. 
Still, this extraterritorial exception for corporate agents was limited 
in two ways. First, the authority of the agent to act on behalf of a 
nonresident defendant dissolved at the border of the state in which it was 
appointed to receive process.28  Second, a court’s jurisdiction over such 
nonresident defendants was only available for claims related to business 
transactions in the state.29  Thus, under Pennoyer, the adjudicatory 
authority of the courts was generally limited to the territorial borders of 
the forum state, and absent actual presence or consent, nonresident 
corporations could never be under the court’s general jurisdiction, no 
matter how extensive its business transactions within the forum. 
2. A Looser Doctrine Approved in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington 
Pennoyer’s strict territoriality regime ended in 1945 when the 
Supreme Court announced the “minimum contacts” test of personal 
jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.30  The Court 
determined that the Due Process Clause would support the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants if two requirements 
were met: first, the defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with 
the forum state; and second, the “maintenance of the suit” against the 
defendant in the forum must not “offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”31  This new minimum contacts test ushered in the 
reigning contacts-based era of personal jurisdiction, wherein jurisdiction 
is a function of the defendant’s relationship with the forum rather than the 
court’s territorial “power” over the defendant. 
                                                                                                                         
liability by virtue of residing outside of the state. E.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 29 & cmt. a, b. (1942). 
 28 See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 357 (1882) (“We do not, however, 
understand the laws as authorizing the service . . . upon an agent of a foreign corporation 
unless the corporation be engaged in business in the state, and the agent be appointed to 
act there.  We so construe the words ‘agent of such corporation within this state.’  They do 
not sanction service upon an officer or agent of the corporation who resides in another 
state, and is only casually in the state, and not charged with any business of the corporation 
there.”); M’Queen, 16 Johns. at 7 (“If the president of a bank of another state, were to come 
within this state, he would not represent the corporation here; his functions and his 
character would not accompany him, when he moved beyond the jurisdiction of the 
government under whose laws he derived this character . . . .”). 
 29 See, e.g., Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22 (1907) 
(“Such assent cannot properly be implied where it affirmatively appears, as it does here, 
that the business was not transacted in [the forum].”). 
 30 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 31 Id. at 316. 
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Beyond loosening the strictly territorial rule of Pennoyer, the Court 
in Int’l Shoe recognized for the first time two distinct strands of personal 
jurisdiction.  In announcing its “minimum contacts” test, the Court 
distinguished between claims that arise out of, or relate to, the defendant’s 
forum contacts—known as specific jurisdiction—and claims that are 
unrelated to defendant’s forum contacts—known as general jurisdiction.  
As to those claims arising out of a non-resident defendant’s in-forum 
contacts, the Court held that subjecting a nonresident corporation to suit 
“can . . . hardly be said to be undue” where it incurs state-law obligations 
in exchange for the privilege of conducting business in the state.32  But 
regarding those claims arising “from dealings entirely distinct” from a 
nonresident corporation’s in-state activities, the Court was more reserved, 
holding that there may be some circumstances “in which the continuous 
corporate operations . . . were thought so substantial and of such a nature 
as to justify suit” against the defendant.33  Accordingly, specific 
jurisdiction became more readily available over nonresident corporate 
defendants.  The ambiguous “continuous corporate operations” basis for 
exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation became known 
as the “doing business” test for general jurisdiction,34 and it has been 
employed successfully on only one occasion.35  For corporations then, Int’l 
Shoe superseded the strict “presence” test of Pennoyer and enabled courts, 
at least in theory, to assert general jurisdiction over nonresident 
corporations if the corporation had constitutionally sufficient in-forum 
contacts, however unrelated to the claim those contacts might be. 
The trajectory of the two jurisdictional strands has been widely 
divergent since their pronouncement.36  While specific jurisdiction 
remains broadly available over nonresident defendants,37 the Court has 
“declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally 
recognized.”38  This more limited exercise of general jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants results from the Court’s determination that the Due 
Process Clause requires a greater showing of forum contacts to exercise 
                                                                                                                         
 32 Id. at 319. 
 33 Id. at 318. 
 34 Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1147 (1966). 
 35 See infra Part I.B.  The standard has been successfully met in lower courts, but 
whether the Supreme Court would uphold many such applications is in serious doubt. 
 36 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 757–58 (2014). 
 37 After Int’l Shoe, even a single contact with the forum can satisfy the minimum 
contacts test for specific jurisdiction.  See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 
223 (1957) (emphasis added) (holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation was proper because “the suit was based on a contract which had 
substantial connection with [the forum state]”). 
 38 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 757–58. 
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general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.39  Where the claims do 
not arise out of or relate to the nonresident corporation’s contacts with the 
forum, the Court has been hesitant to subject the corporation to suit in the 
forum.40  Accordingly, the very contacts that might justify exercising 
specific jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant could be 
insufficient to exercise general jurisdiction.41 
B. THE DECLINE OF “DOING BUSINESS” IN GENERAL JURISDICTION: 
PERKINS, HELICOPTEROS, AND GOODYEAR 
After Int’l Shoe was decided, the Court handed down Perkins v. 
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.42  In Perkins, a Philippines-based 
mining company relocated to Ohio to continue business operations during 
World War II.  Eventually, the company was sued in Ohio for conduct that 
occurred in the Philippines and which was unrelated to its business 
activities in Ohio.  The corporation’s Ohio-based business activity 
included “directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock 
transfers, payments of salaries, [and] purchasing of machinery.”43  The 
Court determined that though the corporation was neither incorporated nor 
maintained its principal place of business in Ohio, its in-state activities 
were nevertheless “continuous and systematic” such that general 
                                                                                                                         
 39 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952) (“It remains 
only to consider . . . whether, as a matter of federal due process, the business done in Ohio 
by the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to 
permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of 
action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio.”). 
 40 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (noting that general jurisdiction has been “less dominant” 
in the court’s due process jurisprudence); see also Michael H. Hoffheimer, General 
Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 549, 550 (2012) (“Goodyear Dunlop Tires, supported by a unanimous Court, 
predictably conformed to prior decisions that evidence the Court’s reluctance to permit 
general jurisdiction over corporations based upon claims unrelated to corporate activity in 
the forum state.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 757 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2849 (2011) (“Although the placement of a product into 
the stream of commerce ‘may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction,’ we 
explained, such contacts ‘do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum 
has general jurisdiction over a defendant.’”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 
770, 779–80 (1984) (“In the instant case, respondent’s activities in the forum may not be 
so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to those activities. 
But respondent is carrying on a ‘part of its general business’ in New Hampshire, and that 
is sufficient to support jurisdiction when the cause of action arises out of the very activity 
being conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.”). 
 42 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 43 Id. at 445. 
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jurisdiction was proper in Ohio for claims entirely unrelated to its activities 
in the forum.44 
Perkins has been considered the outer-limits of general jurisdiction 
in that the Court permitted general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
for claims arising from overseas conduct unrelated to the defendant’s 
activities in the forum.  Accordingly, Perkins has also been considered the 
exemplary case for exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation based on its “doing business” in the forum.45  However, the 
assertion that the Supreme Court in Perkins affirmed “doing business” as 
a constitutionally sound means for establishing general jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation is likely incorrect.46  The Court in one breath explained 
its decision in Perkins as “permitting general jurisdiction where 
defendant’s contacts with the forum were ‘continuous and systematic,’”47 
and in another breath explained that jurisdiction was proper in Perkins 
because Ohio had become the corporation’s “de facto principal place of 
business.”48 
After Perkins came Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 
Hall, a case arising out of a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four United 
States citizens.49  The victims’ survivors filed suit in Texas against the 
manufacturer, a Colombian corporation, arguing that general jurisdiction 
lay because the defendant had negotiated a contract, purchased helicopter 
parts, and sent employees for training in Texas50 and therefore had the 
“kind of continuous and systematic business contacts the Court found to 
exist in Perkins.”51  The Court held, however, that in-state purchases by a 
foreign defendant were insufficient to exercise general jurisdiction over 
it.52  With its holding, the Court curtailed the reach of “doing business” as 
a means to establish general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.  
After Helicopteros, “doing business” general jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants would require more robust business activities than consumer 
transactions within the forum. 
                                                                                                                         
 44 Id. at 448–49. 
 45 See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business 
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172–73 & n.7 (2001) (citing Perkins as the model 
of general jurisdiction based on a foreign corporation’s ‘continuous and systematic’ 
business activities in the forum). 
 46 See discussion infra pp. 20–21. 
 47 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984) (quoting Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448). 
 48 E.g., Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 756; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). 
 49 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 50 Id. at 408. 
 51 Id. at 416. 
 52 Id. at 418. 
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Lastly, following Helicopteros the Court decided Goodyear Dunlop 
v. Brown and unanimously determined that a foreign manufacturer’s sales 
of goods within the forum state did not provide Perkins-like business 
activities for exercising general jurisdiction over the foreign corporation 
in that state.53  In Goodyear, two American boys were killed in France as 
a result of a bus rollover accident.54  The administrators of the boys’ estates 
filed suit in North Carolina state court against Goodyear USA, Goodyear 
France, Goodyear Luxembourg, and Goodyear Turkey, alleging that a tire, 
defectively manufactured and sold by Goodyear Turkey, caused the fatal 
rollover.55  The Court first held that the North Carolina court could not 
exercise specific personal jurisdiction because the deaths in France were 
unrelated to any corporate activity in the state.56  Next, the Court held that 
where “sales of [defendants’] tires [were] sporadically made in North 
Carolina through intermediaries,” the corporate activity in the forum was 
insufficient to support general personal jurisdiction.57  Accordingly, the 
Court concluded, the corporate subsidiaries in Goodyear were “in no sense 
at home” in North Carolina.58 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court confirmed that a corporation’s 
place of incorporation and principal place of business, its “paradigmatic 
affiliations,” are the strongest for establishing general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations.59  Nevertheless, the Court declined an opportunity to 
firmly limit general jurisdiction to a corporation’s place of incorporation 
or principal place of business.  In terms not unlike those of Int’l Shoe, 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, announced that a foreign 
corporation could have such continuous business activity to render it 
“essentially at home” in the forum for purposes of general jurisdiction.60  
In that case, however, Goodyear’s “sporadic” sales to the forum were 
insufficient to render it “essentially at home” in the state.61  The amount 
                                                                                                                         
 53 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see also 
Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 459–50 (2012) (“The unanimous 
opinion categorically distinguished between general and specific personal jurisdiction, 
making clear that limited sales do not satisfy the ‘substantial’ activity or ‘continuous and 
systematic’ contacts required for general jurisdiction.”). 
 54 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 2851. 
 57 Id. at 2856. 
 58 Id. at 2857. 
 59 Id. at 2854 (citing Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 
TEXAS L. REV. 721, 728 (1988) (identifying place of incorporation and principal place of 
business as “paradigm” bases for exercising general jurisdiction over corporations)). 
 60 Id. at 2851. 
 61 Id. at 2857. 
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or type of contacts that could satisfy Goodyear’s “essentially at home” 
standard remains as unclear as Int’l Shoe’s ambiguous “continuous 
business contacts” basis for general jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants. 
After Goodyear, the “doing business” theory of jurisdiction is likely 
abrogated as regards general jurisdiction because merely transacting 
business—via sales (Goodyear) or purchases (Helicopteros)—in the 
forum will be insufficient; rather, the Court requires that the business 
activities be so substantial that a foreign corporation could be fairly 
characterized as “at home” in the paradigmatic senses.  Though Perkins 
gave a glimmer of hope for establishing general jurisdiction based on a 
foreign defendant’s business activities in the state, the Court’s 
pronouncements in Goodyear and Helicopteros prove the reluctance with 
which the Court authorizes general jurisdiction outside of the traditional 
paradigmatic affiliations.  While it remains unclear just what type and 
extent of business activities could render a corporation “essentially at 
home” after Goodyear, that the standard is exceedingly high is clear. 
C. DAIMLER AG V. BAUMAN 
1. The Ninth Circuit Opinion 
The suit in Daimler AG v. Bauman arose out of human rights 
violations committed entirely in Argentina by Mercedes-Benz Argentina 
(MBA), a wholly owned subsidiary of Daimler A.G. (Daimler), a German 
corporation.62  The Plaintiffs, residents of Argentina, alleged that MBA 
conspired with Argentine security forces to effectuate acts of kidnapping, 
detention, torture, and murder.63  The plaintiffs sued Daimler in California, 
alleging Daimler was vicariously liable for its subsidiary’s actions.64  
Because all events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred in Argentina, 
personal jurisdiction in California would only lie if Daimler could be 
subject to general jurisdiction there.  The plaintiffs argued that general 
jurisdiction over Daimler was proper because Mercedes-Benz U.S.A 
(MBUSA)—Daimler’s indirect subsidiary—had sufficient business 
contacts to subject it to California’s general jurisdiction and that those 
contacts could be imputed to Daimler.65 
The Ninth Circuit first determined that MBUSA’s business activities 
in the forum were so “extensive” that it could be considered “at home” in 
                                                                                                                         
 62 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014). 
 63 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) rev’d sub nom. 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 64 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 750–51. 
 65 Id. at 751. 
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the forum and therefore subject to California’s general jurisdiction.66  
Then, the Court applied California agency law and determined that the 
California contacts of MBUSA may be imputed to Daimler for the purpose 
of general jurisdiction.67  After imputing to Daimler the contacts of its “at 
home” subsidiary, the Ninth Circuit held that exercising personal 
jurisdiction over Daimler “comport[ed] with fair play and substantial 
justice.”68 
The loose imputation framework employed by the Ninth Circuit for 
asserting general jurisdiction over foreign corporations was common 
among lower courts before Bauman reached the Supreme Court.  Lower 
courts ended the jurisdictional inquiry over a foreign corporate defendant 
once it could be determined that a subsidiary’s contacts could be imputed 
to the parent under the applicable substantive law of imputation.69  If an 
“at home” subsidiary’s contacts were successfully imputed to the foreign 
parent, the foreign parent was deemed subject to the court’s general 
jurisdiction based on its relationship with its subsidiary.  The approach of 
the lower courts pre-Bauman was flawed in at least two respects:  First, 
the framework threatened an unprecedented expansion of jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations by making general jurisdiction a function of 
inconsistent state substantive rules of imputation rather than traditional 
paradigmatic affiliations.70  Second, the approach implicitly rejected any 
need to establish sufficient jurisdictional contacts as to each individual 
defendant, as the Due Process Clause requires.71 
2. Bauman in the Supreme Court 
Though the Supreme Court had opportunity in Bauman to address 
the first issue of which substantive law would govern when and how a 
subsidiary’s contacts could be imputed to a foreign parent, it turned instead 
to the constitutional due process issue of establishing general jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants based on their contacts with the forum.  The Court 
rejected the current of lower courts exercising general jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                         
 66 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) rev’d sub nom. 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).  Notably, whether MBUSA was 
appropriately subject to general jurisdiction in California based on its business activities 
was not disputed. Id. at 913. 
 67 Id. at 921–24. 
 68 Id. at 929–30. 
 69 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 70 See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60 (“The Ninth Circuit’s agency theory thus appears 
to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state 
subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of 
general jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear.”). 
 71 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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foreign defendants based on imputation alone.72  Instead, the Court 
announced a framework for using vicarious jurisdiction arguments to 
secure general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.  Though largely 
consistent with the framework applied in lower courts, the Court added a 
third prong to the analysis that serves as a constitutional limit on any 
substantive law of imputation that a court could use to find general 
jurisdiction based on attribution of contacts alone.73  The Bauman 
framework is invoked when a plaintiff, seeking to sue a nonresident 
corporate defendant for claims unrelated to its in-forum business activities, 
looks to the corporation’s relationship with some other entity in the chosen 
forum to determine whether the contacts of the related entity might be 
sufficient to hold the defendant responsible in that forum.  In response to 
this typical “vicarious jurisdiction” argument, courts must: 
First, determine whether the other entity—often a wholly or 
majority owned subsidiary74—is “at home” in the forum.75  If it is 
not at home there, the general jurisdiction inquiry is decided 
against the plaintiff because imputation theories, even if available, 
would be unsuccessful under the test. 
Second, determine whether the subsidiary’s in-forum contacts 
may be imputed to the parent under the relevant law.76  If 
imputation is unavailable, the general jurisdiction inquiry ends and 
will be decided against the plaintiff.  For the purposes of this paper, 
the second step in the Bauman framework will be assumed 
satisfied under any standard a court could impose. 
Third, determine whether the foreign parent is yet “at home” in 
the forum after the contacts of its “at home” subsidiary are imputed 
it.77 
Moving through this framework, the Court assumed that MBUSA 
was “at home” in California, though it was neither incorporated nor had 
its principal place of business there.78  The Court also assumed that 
imputation was satisfied under applicable law.79  With the first two prongs 
of its framework presumptively satisfied, the Court moved to the third 
prong of its analysis and determined that Daimler could not be 
characterized as “at home” in California for purposes of general 
                                                                                                                         
 72 Bauman, 132 S.Ct. at 760 n.16 
 73 Bauman, 132 S.Ct. at 760. 
 74 See infra pp. 24–26 and note 96. 
 75 Bauman, 132 S. Ct. at 760. 
 76 Id.; see supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 77 Bauman, 132 S. Ct. at 760. 
 78 Id. at 751, 758, 760. 
 79 Id. at 760. 
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jurisdiction even after being imputed with its “at home” subsidiary’s 
contacts.80  This third prong of the Bauman framework is the platform 
from which this paper springs, attempting to ascertain the circumstances 
that could overcome prong three’s due process limit on the use of vicarious 
jurisdiction arguments for asserting general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporate defendants. 
II. TILTING THE SCALES: USING VICARIOUS JURISDICTION ARGUMENTS 
TO ESTABLISH GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATE 
DEFENDANTS AFTER BAUMAN 
At first blush, the test announced in Bauman appears circular, 
impossible to satisfy because it ends where it begins. Closer inspection, 
however, confirms that the Court did not deviously claim to merely limit 
jurisdictional veil piercing in general jurisdiction while abrogating it in 
practice.  Instead, the Court adhered to its pervasive precedent of narrowly 
construing general jurisdiction over foreign corporations by requiring that 
the “at home” inquiry be individually satisfied as to the foreign defendant 
after imputation.81  Certainly, the Bauman test raises a high bar, limiting 
the efficacy of vicarious jurisdiction arguments to assert general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, but its bar is not insurmountable.  
After Bauman, there remain several limited means by which a foreign 
corporation may be subject to a court’s general jurisdiction based on its 
relationship with another entity in the forum. 
Bauman offers at least four distinct scenarios that, when weighed in 
a post-imputation “at home” analysis as to the parent corporation, could 
tilt the scales in a jurisdictional determination.  First, Bauman indicates 
that courts faced with vicarious jurisdiction arguments must distinguish 
between cases in which a subsidiary is “at home” in the paradigmatic sense 
and cases in which the subsidiary is “essentially at home” by some 
measure of continuous and systematic business contacts.82  Second, the 
Court suggests that in either circumstance, the theory of imputation used 
to attribute contacts may affect the judgment.83  Third, if the subsidiary is 
joined as a defendant in the action, the Court may be more readily 
agreeable to a vicarious jurisdiction argument as to the parent.84  Finally, 
                                                                                                                         
 80 Id. (“Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California, and further 
to assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to 
subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the 
State hardly render it at home there.”). 
 81 See id. at 757–58 (“[W]e have declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits 
traditionally recognized.”). 
 82 See id. at 760–62. 
 83 See id. at 759. 
 84 See id. at 758 & n.12. 
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whether the nonresident corporation is domestic or foreign could sway an 
“at home” analysis as to the parent.85  The arguments for establishing 
vicarious, general jurisdiction after Bauman are analyzed below. 
A. WHETHER THE SUBSIDIARY IS “PARADIGMATICALLY” AT HOME OR 
“ESSENTIALLY” AT HOME BY VIRTUE OF CONTINUOUS AND SYSTEMATIC 
BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
Corporations are traditionally “at home” for purposes of general 
jurisdiction in their state of incorporation and the state in which they 
maintain a principal place of business, if the two are distinct.86  One 
academic has termed these dual corporate homes the “paradigmatic 
affiliations” with the forum that justify the exercise of general 
jurisdiction.87  Paradigmatic affiliations are the strongest but not exclusive 
affiliations that justify general jurisdiction.  Goodyear confirmed that a 
corporate defendant’s subjection to general jurisdiction is not necessarily 
limited to those forums in which it is “incorporated or has its principal 
place of business.”88  Rather, the “at home” inquiry retains an additional 
strand under which a foreign corporation could have “the kind of 
continuous and systematic general business contacts” to render it 
“essentially” at home in the forum such that a court could adjudicate a suit 
unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.89 
If a corporate subsidiary is at home in one of the paradigmatic ways, 
and its contacts are imputed to the parent, the Court may be more inclined 
to find the parent at home in the forum under prong three of the Bauman 
test.  To the contrary, where the subsidiary is “essentially at home” in the 
forum by virtue of its “continuous and systematic” business contacts, and 
its contacts are imputed to the parent, the Court may be less likely to find 
                                                                                                                         
 85 See id. at 762–63. 
 86 Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the 
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an 
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”). 
 87 Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 721, 
728 (1988). 
 88 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849. Other scholars have suggested that the Court had 
foreign corporations in mind when it left open “continuous business operations” as a means 
for establishing general jurisdiction. By default, foreign corporations would have no state 
of incorporation or principal place of business in the United States in which they could be 
deemed “at home.”  Thus the slightly open doors could be to leave open room to argue that 
a foreign corporation should be subject to general jurisdiction in U.S. state in which most 
of their business is transacted. See Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: 
Reconciling Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865, 889 
(2013). 
 89 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850. 
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the parent “at home” in the forum.90  Though the Court did not go so far 
as to create such a per se rule, it provided strong direction. 
In Bauman, the Court glossed over the first prong of its framework 
and assumed “for purposes of [that] decision only” that MBUSA was “at 
home” in California.91  Because the Court later acknowledged that 
MBUSA is neither incorporated in California nor retains its principal place 
of business there, it must be presumed that the Court assumed MBUSA to 
be “essentially at home” by virtue of its continuous and systematic 
business contacts.92  Indeed, MBUSA produced 2.4% of Daimler’s 
worldwide sales, generating billions of dollars in sales revenue for 
Daimler.93  Nevertheless, the Court held that MBUSA’s sales in the 
forum—which were presumed sufficient to render MBUSA “essentially at 
home” in California—were insufficient once attributed to Daimler to 
render Daimler at home there. 
Concluding that Daimler was not “at home” in the forum under prong 
three of its analysis, the Court’s first observation was that “neither Daimler 
nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its 
principal place of business there.”94  The Court’s first matter of concern in 
going about its prong-three “at home” analysis as to the parent was to 
determine whether the subsidiary was paradigmatically at home in the 
forum.  After observing that MBUSA was not paradigmatically at home 
but only—it must be presumed—”essentially at home,” the Court quickly 
determined that imputation of the subsidiary’s contacts to the parent would 
be insufficient to render the parent “at home” in the forum.  Because the 
Bauman test in no way limits its first prong to subsidiaries that are 
paradigmatically at home, it confirms that both paradigmatic and 
“essentially at home” affiliations remain open avenues for accomplishing 
vicarious, general jurisdiction.  The Court’s analysis indicates, however, 
                                                                                                                         
 90 See Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (“[T]he inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a 
foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense “continuous and 
systematic,” it is whether that corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous 
and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”). But see Barriere 
v. Cap Juluca, 12-23510-CIV, 2014 WL 652831 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) (finding a 
foreign parent corporation subject to general jurisdiction after imputing to it the contacts 
of its “essentially at home” subsidiary). 
 91 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 758. 
 92 Accord Suzanna Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme Court 
Should Duck the Issue in DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 111, 
117 (2013) (“The best option would be to revisit the question of MBUSA’s contacts with 
California, which DaimlerChrysler unwisely conceded were sufficient to satisfy the 
‘continuous and systematic’ test for general jurisdiction.  Under current doctrine, it is 
highly questionable that a federal court in California has general personal jurisdiction over 
MBUSA, and the Court could reverse the Ninth Circuit on that ground.”). 
 93 Bauman, 134 S.Ct. at 766–67. 
 94 Id. at 761. 
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that paradigmatic affiliations will provide the weightiest imputable 
contacts for vicarious jurisdiction and that the success of “essentially at 
home” affiliations may be more limited by comparison. 
Such a conclusion is consistent with the Court’s history of largely 
restricting the exercise of general jurisdiction to a defendant’s principal 
place of business or the state of incorporation—its paradigmatic 
affiliations.  In both Helicopteros and in Goodyear, the Court found the 
defendant corporations’ business transactions in the forum were not 
sufficiently continuous or systematic to render it “essentially at home” for 
purposes of general jurisdiction.95  The only case in which the Court has 
found that a foreign corporation’s business activities in the forum were 
amply continuous and systematic to render it “at home” in the forum was 
Perkins.96  Yet, whether Perkins is a case about a foreign corporation being 
rendered “at home” by virtue of continuous and systematic business 
transactions is questionable. 
More likely, Perkins presents a case in which a foreign corporation 
was subject to a court’s general jurisdiction in its principal place of 
business—a true paradigmatic affiliation case.97  Rather than deciding 
Perkins based on the corporation’s “continuous and systematic” business 
activities within the State, the Court looked to those activities to determine 
that Ohio had in fact become the company’s principal place of business 
during wartime.  Indeed, the Court reiterated this understanding of Perkins 
in Bauman when it stated, “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if 
temporary, place of business.”98 
The notion that the Court in Perkins based its assertion of general 
jurisdiction on the quantity of the defendant’s business transactions within 
the forum is an unfortunate misnomer that may have given some plaintiffs 
false hope of a broader doctrine of general jurisdiction.  Accordingly, for 
plaintiffs seeking to establish vicarious, general jurisdiction over a 
nonresident corporation where the subsidiary is not paradigmatically “at 
home” in the forum, such that the “continuous and systematic” standard is 
the sole remaining avenue for finding that subsidiary “at home,” Perkins 
may provide little hope of gain if in fact Perkins was decided on 
paradigmatic affiliations with the forum. 
Thus, where a subsidiary is deemed “essentially at home” rather than 
paradigmatically at home in the forum, the Court may require something 
more to substantiate the parent’s contacts with the forum.  What, exactly, 
                                                                                                                         
 95 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 418; Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2856–57. 
 96 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447. 
 97 See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 98 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 756; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779. 
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that “something more” might be is uncertain, though three considerations 
remain relevant: 1) whether imputation was accomplished by agency or 
alter ego theories; 2) whether the subsidiary whose contacts the plaintiff 
seeks to impute to the parent is joined as a defendant; and 3) whether 
assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant corporation raises foreign 
relations or foreign commerce concerns.  These concerns will be discussed 
in turn below. 
B. WHETHER IMPUTATION IS ACCOMPLISHED BY AGENCY OR ALTER EGO 
THEORIES 
Agency theories of imputation are available where the parent 
corporation does not have direct ownership of the subsidiary but maintains 
some level of control over it such that attribution of contacts would be 
appropriate.99  Alter-ego theories of imputation are available where the 
relationship between the parent corporation and its subsidiary is such that 
corporate separateness should be disregarded.  Generally, alter-ego 
theories are applied in one of two circumstances: 1) Where the subsidiary 
acts on behalf of the parent—doing what the parent itself would do;100 or 
2) Where the corporate structure of the parent and the subsidiary are so 
intertwined that the corporations appear to operate as part of the same 
entity, such as where the two entities have interlocking directorates, 
personnel, or document exchange.101 
Bauman indicates that both agency and alter-ego theories of 
imputation are available to establish general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporate parents, but that alter-ego theories may be more readily available 
than agency theories, which will be subject to greater limitations in the 
context of general jurisdiction.102  If an agency theory of imputation is 
employed to pierce the jurisdictional veil as to a foreign corporate parent, 
                                                                                                                         
 99 See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 48–49 (N.Y. 1967) 
(finding that the localized, sister corporation performed services “on behalf of” the foreign 
corporation such that the foreign corporation itself performed the services locally); Wiwa 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 255 F.3d 88, 96–99 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding an investor 
relations office in New York acted on behalf of foreign corporate parent such that foreign 
parents subject to suit in New York based on business activities there); Cartwright v. 
Fokker Aircraft U.S.A., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 389, 393 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that the 
domestic subsidiary-distributor was an agent of the foreign corporate parent for purposes 
of establishing jurisdiction over the foreign parent). 
 100 E.g., In re Telectronics Paper Sys., 953 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Ohio 1997), rev’d on 
other grounds, 221 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 101 Compare Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packaging Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335 (1925), 
with United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 816 (1948). 
 102 See Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (“[W]e need not pass judgment on invocation of an 
agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals court’s 
analysis be sustained.”). 
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a plaintiff could be limited by the subsidiary-agent’s relationship to the 
litigation—whether the subsidiary-agent’s contacts with the forum relate 
to the underlying claims—given traditional principles of agency theory in 
general personal jurisdiction.103  On the other hand, where an alter ego or 
merger theory of imputation is used, a plaintiff will not be hindered by the 
subsidiary’s relationship with the litigation, but rather by the subsidiary’s 
relationship with the parent corporation.  If the subsidiary’s relationship 
with the parent is too attenuated to satisfy an alter-ego theory, plaintiffs 
seeking to attribute contacts will be relegated to arguing agency theories 
of imputation. 
Before the Court in Bauman was an attempt to employ an agency 
theory of imputation to render the foreign parent corporation liable in 
California for the activities of a direct subsidiary in Argentina, based on 
the imputed contacts of an indirect subsidiary in California.104  Said 
another way, the plaintiffs in Bauman wanted to assert vicarious 
jurisdiction over the parent corporation by imputing to it the contacts of a 
California subsidiary-“agent” whose contacts with the forum were 
unrelated to the underlying, Argentina-based claim.  Given MBUSA’s 
relationship with the litigation and the forum, it could only be subject to 
general jurisdiction, and not specific personal jurisdiction, in California 
because the underlying action did not arise from MBUSA’s contact in 
California.105  Traditionally, a court could exercise jurisdiction on a 
foreign corporation if process was served on its appointed in-state agent.106  
Yet, service of process on the corporate agent would only subject the 
foreign corporation to the court’s jurisdiction for claims related to the 
business it transacted in the state—its specific jurisdiction.107  In Bauman, 
the Court recalled this limiting principle when it speculated that using 
agency theories of imputation to exercise general jurisdiction over a 
foreign defendant for claims unrelated to the subsidiary’s activities in the 
forum may be inappropriate in the first instance: “A subsidiary . . . might 
be its parent’s agent for claims arising in the place where the subsidiary 
operates, yet not its agent regarding claims arising elsewhere.”108  The 
Court made no further announcement as to the propriety of agency theories 
of imputation where the imputable contacts of the “agent” are unrelated to 
the underlying claims.  The Court likewise made no announcement as to 
                                                                                                                         
 103 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 104 See generally Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 750–51, 758–60. 
 105 Id. at 750–51. 
 106 See discussion, supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 107 Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22 (1907) (“[S]uch assent 
cannot properly be implied where it affirmatively appears, as it does here, that the business 
was not transacted in [the forum].”). 
 108 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759. 
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the propriety of using an agency theory to impute the contacts of an 
indirect subsidiary to gain vicarious jurisdiction.109  Instead, the Court 
simply held that under no circumstance could the Ninth Circuit’s agency 
theory be upheld.110 
With this landscape in mind, where an agency theory is used to 
impute a subsidiary’s contacts to a foreign corporation, the due process 
analysis of whether the parent corporation is “at home” in the forum after 
imputation may be severely weakened if the imputed contacts of the 
“agent” are unrelated to the claims.  In traditional terms, the agent whose 
contacts are being imputed will be sufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction over the parent only when the claims relate to that agent’s 
activities in the forum.111  In other words, an agency theory of imputation 
will likely only be successful if invoked where the subsidiary, if named as 
a defendant, would be subject to the court’s specific jurisdiction.  Thus, if 
an agency theory of imputation is used, and the “at home” subsidiary’s 
contacts with the forum are unrelated to the underlying claims, the Court 
will likely find that the subsidiary’s contacts will not render the foreign 
parent “at home” in the forum for the purpose of general jurisdiction 
because the subsidiary would not be the parent’s agent for those unrelated 
                                                                                                                         
 109 By way of comparison, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunizes 
from suit any “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign sovereign. 28 U.S.C. § 1603. Under 
the statute, “agency or instrumentality” includes corporate entities that are wholly or 
majority owned by the sovereign at the time of filing. Id. § 1603(b); see also Dole Foods 
Co. v Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).  The Court has further determined that an entity 
that is merely indirectly owned by the sovereign is not an “agency or instrumentality” for 
purposes of the statute. Dole Foods Co., 538 U.S. at 474.  While MBUSA was an indirectly 
owned subsidiary of Daimler during the pendency of the litigation, it was wholly owned 
by Daimler “at times relevant to [the] suit” but not at the time of filing. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 
at 753 n.3.  Whether the FSIA’s approach or the Dole Foods rule are applicable in the 
context of non-sovereign, private corporate activity is to be determined. Litigations should 
keep Dole Foods at hand, however, when attempting to use agency theories of imputation 
to establish general jurisdiction over a foreign parent based on the contacts of an indirect 
subsidiary.  It could be that the Court would find agency theory unavailable in such a 
context.  Likely, the rule of thumb to take away is that a federal statute governing the cause 
of action may affect whether and to what extent an agency theory may be used under the 
circumstances. See also United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51, 70–71 (1998) (holding 
that a participation-and-control test looking to the parent corporation’s supervision over 
subsidiary cannot be used to identify operation of a facility resulting in direct parental 
liability under CERCLA). 
 110 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60 (citations omitted) (“The Ninth Circuit’s agency 
theory thus appears to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they 
have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the 
‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear.”). 
 111 Accord Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at 17, 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2013) (No. 11-965) (“[N]one of this Court’s cases 
have used ‘agency’ to impose general jurisdiction under circumstances remotely 
approaching this case’s.”). 
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claims.  Any other holding would be an expansion of general 
jurisdiction—a doctrine that the Court continues to restrict—as well as 
agency law. 
Further, the subsidiary at issue in Bauman—MBUSA—was an 
indirect subsidiary of Daimler.112  That is, it was neither wholly nor 
majority owned by the parent.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs could hardly 
hope to use an alter ego or merger theory to impute MBUSA’s contacts to 
Daimler because such theories are based on the notion of “like-identity.”113  
Without interlocking corporate structures between the two entities, the 
plaintiffs would have faced high hurdles to satisfy a merger theory, and 
with an agency theory available to them of so low a caliber that it would 
practically always be satisfied, the plaintiffs in Bauman took the path of 
least resistance and neglected to allege that MBUSA was an alter-ego of 
Daimler.114 
Because the plaintiffs in Bauman did not allege an “alter ego” theory 
to impute MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler, the Court made no comment on 
the propriety or strength of invoking alter ego theories in the context of 
general jurisdiction.115  Presumably, however, imputation by theories of 
merger or alter ego could supply imputed contacts weighty enough to tilt 
the scales to a finding that the parent corporation is at home in the forum, 
irrespective of whether the “at home” subsidiary’s contacts are related to 
the litigation.116  Merger and alter ego theories of imputation, unlike 
agency theories, would not be limited to instances in which the 
subsidiary’s forum contacts are related to the claim because no such 
traditional principles apply to limit the boundaries of the relationship.  
Instead, such theories meet resistance based on the strength of the 
subsidiary’s relationship to the parent.  Often, whether the subsidiary is 
wholly or majority owned by the parent is dispositive of whether the 
                                                                                                                         
 112 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 752. 
 113 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 114 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758. 
 115 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (“This Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign 
corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its 
in-state subsidiary. Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a 
subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so 
dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego.”). 
 116 Accord Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at 9, 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2013) (No. 11-965) (“Absent a specific-
jurisdiction basis, . . . nothing short of the “merger” or “alter ego” standard can satisfy the 
Due Process Clause’s requirement that jurisdiction over each defendant be shown 
individually.”); Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive 
Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1986) 
(“If merger is shown, however, all of the activities of the subsidiary are by definition 
activities of the parent. Merger requires a greater showing of interconnectedness than 
attribution, but once shown, its scope is broader.”). 
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entities are sufficiently intertwined to justify ignoring corporate 
separateness and applying an alter-ego theory to impute contacts and hold 
the parent responsible for the subsidiary’s behavior.117  Accordingly, 
where the subsidiary is a true alter ego of the parent, a court may be less 
hesitant to find the parent “at home” based on the subsidiary’s imputed 
contacts because the relationship between the two entities is by definition 
more robust.  Holding a parent responsible for acts of a subsidiary with 
which its relationship is so intertwined that corporate separateness may be 
appropriately disregarded is a justifiable basis for exercising general 
jurisdiction based on imputation because it would be akin to holding the 
parent corporation responsible for its own acts. 
Thus, courts performing the third prong of the analysis may be more 
likely to find that imputed contacts render the foreign defendant “at home” 
where an alter ego theory of imputation is invoked.  The Court leaves the 
door open for both theories to successfully invoke general jurisdiction over 
a foreign defendant, but in either circumstance, it is unclear from Bauman 
what sort of standard would supply a satisfactory test for imputation.118 
C. WHETHER THE SUBSIDIARY IS JOINED AS A DEFENDANT 
If the subsidiary whose contacts are to be imputed is joined as a 
defendant in the action, courts may find that the jurisdictional contacts 
imputed to the parent are weightier when conducting the final “at home” 
analysis as to the parent.  As observed by a Florida District Court, where 
a plaintiff has joined the subsidiary as a co-defendant, and the subsidiary 
has not objected to jurisdiction, the Court necessarily has power over the 
subsidiary, and extending its jurisdiction to the parent—assuming a theory 
of imputation has been met—would be most proper.119  First, this approach 
best observes due process limits because courts would not proceed to 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign parent based on the contacts of a 
subsidiary as to whom no jurisdictional basis has been shown as a matter 
of law.  Second, this approach best honors corporate separateness by better 
ensuring that parent corporations are held vicariously liable for a 
                                                                                                                         
 117 See supra note 109. 
 118 See supra note 10. 
 119 See Barriere v. Cap Juluca, No.12-23510-CIV, 2014 WL 652831, slip op. at *9 (S.D. 
Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) (“Additionally, in Daimler, the foreign Plaintiffs attempted to gain 
jurisdiction over the foreign defendant by piggybacking on the defendant’s subsidiary’s 
contacts and imputing them back to the defendant. The U.S.-based subsidiary, however, 
was not a defendant in that action. In the case at bar, the Plaintiff has alleged agency 
relationships among [the subsidiaries] and [the foreign parent]. Unlike in Daimler, the 
alleged agent is a co-defendant in the case, and it has not objected to jurisdiction. Thus, 
Defendant Cap Juluca is asking this Court to dismiss it even where the Court already 
properly exercises jurisdiction over the co-defendants. This, the court will not do.”). 
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subsidiary’s actions only where both the parent and the subsidiary may 
have collaborated in the wrongful conduct. 
A court has power to adjudicate claims against defendants over 
whom it has personal jurisdiction.120  Where a subsidiary is joined as a 
defendant in an action, a court can actually exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the subsidiary, and such jurisdiction is established as a matter of law.  
On the other hand, where the subsidiary is not joined, a court cannot 
actually exercise jurisdiction over the subsidiary even if jurisdiction would 
be proper, and jurisdiction over the non-joined subsidiary is merely 
theoretical.  A court may be hesitant to use the subsidiary’s contacts with 
the forum to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident parent when it is 
unclear or otherwise unestablished that the court would have power to 
adjudicate the same claims against the subsidiary in the first instance. 
In Bauman, the plaintiffs did not join MBUSA in the action, and the 
Court accordingly did not have power over it; instead, the Court 
“assumed” that MBUSA was at home in the forum for purposes of 
exercising general jurisdiction over Daimler.121  The Court acknowledged 
that MBUSA held no “paradigmatic” affiliations with the forum and that 
whether it would be subject to general jurisdiction in California under 
Goodyear was uncertain.122  As in Bauman, if the non-joined subsidiary 
has no paradigmatic affiliations with the forum and could be subject to 
general jurisdiction only by virtue of Goodyear’s “essentially at home” 
standard, a plaintiff could decline joining the subsidiary in the action, go 
after only the parent, and face less resistance establishing general 
jurisdiction over the parent because the subsidiary would be unable to 
contest jurisdiction as to itself.123  A court exercising its jurisdictional 
power over the parent based on the jurisdiction it “could have” over the 
subsidiary creates a more attenuated link between the parent and the forum 
that does not justify the exercise of general jurisdiction.  On the other hand, 
if the non-joined subsidiary is paradigmatically at home in the forum, the 
impropriety of using its jurisdictional contacts to sue the foreign parent is 
significantly less.  In that case, whether the subsidiary is at home in the 
forum, though not litigated, is virtually assured such that the court would 
be able to litigate claims against that subsidiary. 
Regardless of whether the non-joined subsidiary is paradigmatically 
at home, the basic theory of vicarious jurisdiction presupposes that the 
                                                                                                                         
 120 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 121 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 (2014). 
 122 Id. at 752. 
 123 E.g., Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (noting that Daimler failed to object to plaintiff’s 
assertion that MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction in California because MBUSA 
was not a co-defendant). 
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foreign parent is responsible alongside the subsidiary for the wrongful 
conduct,124 and where a plaintiff does not join the subsidiary as a co-
defendant, suspicion should be raised that imputation is improper in the 
first instance.  If the plaintiff’s argument is that the parent corporation 
should be held vicariously liable—that is, liable as a joint actor—for the 
wrongful conduct, then the subsidiary should be joined as a reflection and 
confirmation of the subsidiary and parent’s dual participation in the 
conduct.  Where a plaintiff neglects to join the subsidiary, but goes after 
the parent, the concern is that the subsidiary may be the truly wrongful 
actor, but the parent has the deeper pockets.  Disregard for corporate 
separateness where the parent did not collaborate with the subsidiary in 
wrongful conduct would fun afoul of the basic concept justifying the 
responsibility-shifting function of vicarious jurisdiction.125 
Accordingly, imputation theories to establish vicarious jurisdiction 
are best invoked where the subsidiary is named as a co-defendant.  First, 
this approach ensures that the court predicates its power to adjudicate 
claims against the parent on an affirmation of its power to adjudicate 
claims against the subsidiary in the first place.  Second, this approach 
reflects the joint responsibility concept implicit in the doctrine of vicarious 
jurisdiction.  Any other rule would encourage foul play in litigation. 
D. HAS THE COURT ADDED A “TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT” INQUIRY TO 
THE PARENT’S “AT HOME” DETERMINATION? 
After applying its three-part test to the facts in Bauman, the Court 
turned to an examination of the transaction’s international context and 
determined that the Ninth Circuit’s sweeping rule of vicarious, general 
jurisdiction would greatly burden U.S. relations with other sovereigns.126  
The progression of the Court’s analysis indicates that whether the parent 
is a foreign corporation or a nonresident, a domestic corporation could tilt 
the scales for or against a finding of general jurisdiction. 
The readiness of U.S. courts to hold foreign corporations liable for 
the conduct of their U.S. subsidiaries is often met with frustration by other 
countries that embrace a less expansive approach to general jurisdiction.127  
As a result, the United State’s liberal exercise of general jurisdiction has 
                                                                                                                         
 124 See, e.g., Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 116, at 12 (recognizing that imputation 
theories disregard the separateness of corporate entities and shift responsibility from the 
subsidiary to the parent). 
 125 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 126 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762–63. 
 127 Id. at 763. European countries, as an example, embrace a much narrower application 
of general jurisdiction, permitting suit against corporations for unrelated claims only in the 
country of their domicile. Id. 
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hampered negotiations of international treaties due to objections of foreign 
governments to the expansive exercise of general jurisdiction in U.S. 
district courts.128  Unlike foreign corporations, subjecting domestic 
corporations to a court’s general jurisdiction will almost never offend or 
intrude into the sovereignty of another country because the domestic 
corporation is, by definition, formed pursuant to the laws of a U.S. State.  
Recognizing that subjecting Daimler to suit could inflame foreign 
frustration with U.S. jurisprudence regarding foreign entities, the Court 
concluded that the transaction’s international context weighed heavily 
against exercising jurisdiction over Daimler.129 
In addition to creating tense relations with foreign sovereigns, broad 
and unpredictable applications of general jurisdiction could dissuade 
foreign entities from investing in business ventures within the United 
States.130  State substantive laws that supply the theories of imputation 
vary from state to state.131  Inconsistent state imputation laws present 
foreign corporations with great uncertainty and diminished predictability, 
making it difficult for foreign corporations “to structure their primary 
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and 
will not render them liable to suit.”132  Unpredictability and uncertainty as 
to where a foreign corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction 
creates an operational nightmare for foreign corporations whose conduct 
may satisfy the laws of one state yet violate the laws of another.  
Accordingly, foreign corporations may be deterred from business within 
the United States for fear of increased exposure to liability where general 
jurisdiction is so expansive as to reach a foreign corporation for claims 
unrelated to the business it transacts within a given forum. 
Nonresident domestic corporations are not similarly burdened by 
unpredictability and uncertainty as to where they might be hailed into court 
to defend themselves.  Large domestic corporations that do business 
nationally are subject to specific jurisdiction in all state forums under the 
minimum contacts test of Int’l Shoe.133  In the context of general 
jurisdiction, at least one U.S. court can exercise jurisdiction over a 
domestic corporation based on its paradigmatic affiliations.134  To the 
contrary, foreign corporations have no such paradigmatic affiliations, and 
no U.S. court may exercise general jurisdiction absent a showing that the 
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 134 E.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854. 
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foreign corporation is “essentially at home” in that forum.  Appropriately, 
the Court in Bauman foreclosed general, vicarious jurisdiction over 
Daimler and steered its jurisprudence toward a rule of greater 
predictability for corporations in order to encourage foreign business in 
the United States. 
By limiting the extent to which a foreign corporation is subjected to 
a court’s general jurisdiction, the Court accounted for the federal interests 
in the “[g]overnment’s foreign relations policies”135 as well as the 
potentially negative impact on foreign business investment.  After 
Bauman, a court may be more likely to exercise general jurisdiction over 
a nonresident, domestic, as opposed to foreign, corporation that has been 
deemed “at home” under prong three of the Bauman analysis because the 
foreign comity inquiry will almost always be settled against a domestic 
corporation but in favor of a foreign corporation.  Accordingly, whether a 
plaintiff can successfully use vicarious jurisdiction arguments to exercise 
general jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant may depend 
upon whether the corporation is a domestic nonresident or a truly foreign 
corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
At times, a corporation may be held responsible for the wrongful 
conduct of a separate corporate entity with which it has some significant 
relationship.  In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court addressed the 
boundaries of this sort of corporate, jurisdictional blame-shifting in the 
context general jurisdiction.  The Court held that in limited circumstances, 
the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of general jurisdiction over a 
parent corporation based on its subsidiary’s relationship with the forum.  
While lower courts routinely exercised jurisdiction over foreign parents 
after a simple finding that an “at home” subsidiary’s contacts with the 
forum could be imputed to the parent, the Court in Bauman rejected that 
approach and announced a new test that requires a jurisdictional inquiry 
be independently conducted as to the parent after the subsidiary’s contacts 
have been imputed to it. 
After Bauman, the question arises: Under what circumstances would 
a foreign corporation, imputed with its subsidiary’s contacts, be deemed 
“at home” in a forum wherein its own contacts with the forum were 
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction in the first instance?  A close 
examination of the Court’s analysis in Bauman offers several insights into 
                                                                                                                         
 135 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).  It 
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remaining avenues for using vicarious jurisdiction arguments to establish 
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 
First, a subsidiary that is paradigmatically at home in the forum, 
rather than “essentially at home” there, will have weightier jurisdictional 
contacts for imputation such that the “at home” inquiry as to the parent 
will be settled against the corporation.  Second, if the imputation theory 
used to attribute contacts is an alter ego or merger theory, the jurisdictional 
contacts will be weightier and subject to fewer traditional limitations than 
an agency theory of imputation.  Third, if the subsidiary is joined as a 
defendant in the matter, then its imputed contacts are more likely to weigh 
in favor of jurisdiction because the basic concept of vicarious jurisdiction 
is that two entities acted together or as one entity in some wrongful 
conduct.  Failure to join the subsidiary also forces the court to make a 
jurisdictional finding as to the parent based on the presumed, but not 
established, jurisdiction it might have over the subsidiary.  Without legal 
certainty that the court has power to adjudicate claims over the subsidiary 
in the first place, the jurisdictional contacts of the subsidiary are weaker 
when imputed to the parent.  Fourth, suits against foreign corporations, 
unlike nonresident domestic corporations, burden U.S. foreign relations 
with other nations.  Accordingly, a comity analysis will likely be settled 
against the exercise of general jurisdiction over the foreign corporations. 
After Bauman, the availability of vicarious, general jurisdiction over 
a foreign corporation is limited to those places wherein it—and not simply 
its subsidiary—is deemed “at home.”  When conducting an at home 
analysis as to the parent, each of the considerations identified above will 
be examined and weighed on a case-by-case basis. Whether any one factor 
is dispositive is uncertain.  The Court set a high bar in Bauman, 
intentionally limiting the sweep of general, vicarious jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, the Court did not foreclose its availability entirely, leaving 
a window of hope for plaintiffs and a shield of protection for foreign 
corporations. 
 
